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The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
A Uniquely Equipped Testbed for (the Limits of) Human Rights Integration? 
Dr Adamantia Rachovitsa* 
 
 
1. Introduction  
International human rights law is embedded within an international law that is 
fragmented by design. At the same time, human rights law itself forms a fragmented universe, 
on account of both its multilevel architecture and governance — comprising universal, regional 
and subregional levels of protection — and the (over)specialisation of the field. Against this 
background, human rights integration is seen as a means to mitigate certain of the challenges 
associated with this fragmentation. Human rights integration may also be an opportunity to 
restore focus on the user(s) of the human rights system, and one the arguments that can be 
employed with the aim of framing an individual’s claims and calling for the highest possible 
level of protection across different regimes and specialties.1  
Within the confines of positive law, human rights integration can be pursued on three 
different levels/stages: first, when States draft a human rights treaty; second, when an 
international court or other international body interprets that treaty and, third, when the treaty 
is applied.2 Human rights integration is, accordingly, constrained by the limitations attached to 
these three different tasks. In this regard, this chapter argues that the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) is uniquely situated to pursue human rights integration. This is 
due to three distinctive features pertaining to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR)3 and the ACtHPR’s mandate. First, the indivisibility, interdependence and 
interrelation of human rights are not merely underlying principles and postulates but are 
specifically entrenched in the text of the ACHPR; the ACHPR provides civil and political rights 
alongside economic, social and cultural rights and peoples’ rights. Second, the ACtHPR enjoys 
the jurisdiction to interpret and apply not only the ACHPR but also any other relevant human 
rights instrument ratified by the States concerned. Hence, the ACtHPR enjoys a considerably 
                                               
* Assistant Professor of Public International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Groningen, The Netherlands. E-
mail: a.rachovitsa@rug.nl.  
1 E BREMS, ‘Should Pluriform Human Rights Become One? Exploring the Benefits of Human Rights Integration’ 
[2014] European Journal of Human Rights 447.  
2 Interestingly, domestic courts have a different and more expansive (vis-à-vis international courts) role in 
pursuing human rights integration. See A RACHOVITSA, ‘Treaty Clauses and Fragmentation of International Law: 
Applying the More Favourable Protection Clause in Human Rights Treaties’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review 
77, 81-83. 
3 (Adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) Organisation of African Unity, CAB/LEG/67/3 
rev. 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982). 
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broader mandate ratione materiae vis-à-vis other international human rights courts. Third, the 
ACtHPR is specifically directed by Articles 60 and 61 ACHPR to draw inspiration from other 
international instruments when interpreting the rights envisaged in the ACHPR. 
The chapter discusses two out of these three distinctive features in connection with 
human rights integration. The analysis on the ACtHPR’s jurisdiction merits separate discussion 
and it will not be treated in this chapter. Consequently, this chapter focuses on human rights 
integration in the drafting of the ACHPR (Part 2) and human rights integration when the 
ACtHPR interprets the ACHPR (Part 3). Although the ACHPR and the practice of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission or Commission) have 
attracted the attention of international scholars, it is surprising that not much has been written 
since the ACtHPR started to develop its case law.4 The analysis herein provides the first 
assessment of how the ACtHPR has addressed these issues in its existing jurisprudence (the 
ACtHPR has, as of 30 October 2017, decided sixteen cases on their merits).5  
 
2. Human Rights Integration in the Drafting of the ACHPR and the Potential of 
the African Human Rights Corpus Juris  
The ACHPR is a rather unique treaty, according equal weight to all three generations 
of human rights: it provides civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; and 
also peoples’ rights. Economic, social and cultural rights include the right to work under 
equitable and satisfactory conditions (Article 15), the right to health (Article 16), the right to 
education (Article 17) and the right to a healthy environment (Articles 23 and 24). Peoples’ 
rights encompass the right to self-determination (Articles 20 and 22) and the right to dispose 
of natural resources (Article 21). Another characteristic of the ACHPR is its emphasis on the 
duties of the individual towards the community and the State (Article 29). At the same time, 
the ACHPR omits certain rights (e.g. there is no right to privacy under the ACHPR) and it 
envisages fewer safeguards compared with other human rights treaties, as can be seen from the 
poor drafting of the provisions concerning criminal procedure before and during trial (Articles 
                                               
4 For two recent studies see See JD MUJUZI, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Its Protection 
of the Right to a Fair Trial’ (2017) 16 The Law & Practice of International Court and Tribunals 187, 198 and F 
VILJOEN, ‘Understanding and Overcoming Challenges in Accessing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’ (2018) 67 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 63. 
5 More specifically, the ACtHPR has finalised, in the exercise of its contentious jurisdiction, forty-one cases: 
eighteen were declared inadmissible, three were struck off the docket, sixteen were decided on their merits (two 
of which were decided jointly) and three were judgments on the interpretation of the ACtHPR’s rulings. 
Information available at http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-18-21#finalised-cases 
(accessed 23.10.2017). 
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6 and 7), the limited scope of the right to vote (Article 13), the introduction of claw-back 
clauses and the vague language of the limitation clauses.6  
The role of the ACtHPR (and the African Commission) is critical for developing the 
special features of the ACHPR and the rights provided therein. This role is marked not only by 
the novelty of economic, social and cultural rights and peoples’ rights being justiciable and 
adjudicated by and before an international human rights court, but also the potential for 
construing the interrelatedness and indivisibility of human rights in more effective — and 
perhaps new — ways. To this end, human rights integration can be relevant both as an 
interpretative argument and/or principle (or rather, perhaps, as a set of interpretative arguments 
and/or principles) and as an outcome of that interpretation process, in two distinct ways. First, 
human rights integration can be relevant in making international law and human rights 
responsive to African circumstances and in advancing the African human rights corpus juris.7 
The Commission has begun to develop the contours of a regional human rights culture and the 
ACtHPR should build on this.8 Second, and conversely, one needs to bear in mind the possible 
subsequent contribution of the African corpus juris to the progressive development of 
international law.9  
On certain occasions, the African Commission’s interpretations have been 
characterised as either ‘very progressive’ or ‘dangerously loose’ constructions of the Charter.10 
For example, the Commission read the right to housing and the right to food into the ACHPR, 
even though these are not provided therein. The Commission’s reasoning was grounded on the 
fact that the right to housing and the right to food are inseparably linked to the dignity of human 
beings and are essential for the enjoyment and fulfilment of other rights, such as the rights to 
property, health and family life.11 Turning to another issue, in the Social and Economic Rights 
                                               
6 C HEYNS, ‘The African Regional Human Rights System: In Need of Reform?’ (2001) 2 African Human Rights 
Law Journal 155, 161; E BREMS, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague 2001, pp 116-117, 126-128, 133-136. 
7 African Commission on Human Rights, Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for 
Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria, App. No. 155/96, 27 October 2001 § 68. 
8 R MURRAY, ‘A Comparison between the African and European Courts of Human Rights’, (2002) 2 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 195, 219; I BANTEKAS and L OETTE, International Human Rights Law and Practice, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2016 2nd ed, p 281; M MUTUA, ‘The African Human Rights Court: A 
Two-Legged Stool?’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 342, 362. 
9 See also AK PERRIN, ‘African Jurisprudence for Africa’s Problems: Human Rights Norm Diffusion and Norm 
Generation Through Africa’s Regional International Court’ (2015) American Society International Law 
Proceedings 32. On the contribution of the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights 
to the development of international law see respectively H LAUTERPACHT, The Development of International Law 
by the International Court, Steven & Sons Limited, London 1958, pp 37-40 and JG MERRILLS, The Development 
of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights, Manchester University Press, 1993, 2nd ed. 
10 I BANTEKAS and L OETTE, above note 8, pp 279-280. 
11 SERAC and CESR v Nigeria §§ 60, 65 
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Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria case, 
the Commission made certain important pronouncements concerning peoples’ rights by 
articulating the collective nature of such rights in light of the ACHPR’s provisions. The case 
concerned the protection of the Ogoni people from the adverse effects of oil exploration in the 
Niger Delta. Forced evictions were found to constitute a violation of the right to housing 
enjoyed by the Ogoni as a collective right.12 Moreover, the Commission accepted the 
applicants’ allegation linking Article 4 on the right to life and integrity of the person to the life 
of the Ogoni society as a whole. The Commission went on to find that Nigeria had violated 
Article 4 with respect not only to specific individuals in Ogoniland but also to the Ogoni 
community as a whole.13 This was an innovative approach for 2001 and even vis-à-vis the 
progressive case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) on indigenous 
peoples’ rights established in 2007 in the Saramaka judgment.14  
The ACtHPR, for its part, has not yet had many opportunities to develop the distinctive 
rights provided in the ACHPR.15 The ACtHPR has decided, as of 30 October 2017, sixteen 
complaints on their merits, involving the following States: Côte d’Ivoire (one case), Kenya 
(one case), Libya (one case), Senegal (one case), Malawi (one case), Rwanda (one case) 
Burkina Faso (two cases) and Tanzania (eight cases). The subject matter of the complaints 
mostly concerned well-established civil and political rights, including the right to political 
participation and the question of whether the prohibition of independent candidature violates 
an aspirant’s right to participate in public affairs;16 the right to equal protection under the law 
in the context of assessing the impartiality and independence of electoral bodies;17 the right to 
freedom of expression in connection with the right to effective remedy18 and the question of 
whether criminal defamation statutes are a proportionate and necessary restriction on freedom 
of expression;19 the right to life;20 the right to be free from arbitrary deprivation of liberty;21 
                                               
12 Ibid § 63. 
13 Ibid § 67. 
14 Saramaka People v Suriname, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C, 
No. 17, 28 November 2007 § 171.  
15 There is one case concerning indigenous peoples’ rights (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
v Republic of Kenya, App. No 006/2012, Judgment on Merits, 26 May 2017) and it will be discussed in Part 3.3. 
16 Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights Centre and Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila v United 
Republic of Tanzania, App. Nos. 009 & 011/2011, Judgment on Merits, 14 June 2013. 
17 Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme (APDH) v Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, App. No. 001/2014, 
Judgment on Merits, 18 November 2016. 
18 Abdoulaye Nikiema, Ernest Zongo, Blaise Ilboudo & Burkinabe Human and Peoples’ Rights Movement v 
Burkina Faso, App. No. 013/2011, Judgment on Merits, 28 March 2014. 
19 Lohé Issa Konaté v Burkina Faso, App. No. 004/2013, Judgment on Merits, 5 December 2014. 
20 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Libya, Appl. No. 002/2013, Judgment on Merits, 3 
June 2016. 
21 Ibid. 
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the right to be free from torture;22 and several aspects of the right to a fair trial (e.g. the right to 
be heard and to defend oneself, the right to be tried within a reasonable time, to free legal 
assistance and to the pronouncement of a judgment in open court).23 These are the first years 
of the ACtHPR’s functioning and in due time the alleged violations and the countries concerned 
will become more varied.24  
  
 
3 The Interpretative Use of Relevant International Instruments as a Means to Pursue 
Human Rights Integration 
The interpretative use of relevant international instruments not only tells us about the 
ACtHPR’s openness to other standards in general, but can also be a means to pursue human 
rights integration. The use of other international instruments implicates the ACtHPR in the 
construction of an international and regional corpus juris on human rights. Moreover, the use 
of other international instruments and the views of other bodies in the process of interpretation 
mitigates the risk of conflicting or diverging interpretations of similar or identical treaty 
provisions. This is particularly important in light of the ACtHPR’s distinctively broad 
contentious jurisdiction. Pursuant to Article 3(1)Protocol ‘The jurisdiction of the Court shall 
extend to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of 
the Charter, this Protocol and any other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States 
concerned’(emphases added).25 The risk of divergent interpretations of other human rights 
treaties when the ACtHPR engages with, interprets and applies these treaties is an issue which 
has not been addressed by neither the ACHPR nor the Protocol.26 At the same time, however, 
                                               
22 Alex Thomas v United Republic of Tanzania, App. No. 005/2013, Judgment on Merits, 20 November 2015; The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Libya. 
23 Alex Thomas; Wilfred Onyango Nganyi & 9 Others v United Republic of Tanzania, App. No. 006/2013, 
Judgment on Merits, 18 March 2016; Mohamed Abubakari v United Republic of Tanzania, App. No. 007/2013, 
Judgment on Merits, 3 June 2016; Christopher Jonas v United Republic of Tanzania, Appl. No. 011/2015, 
Judgment on Merits, 28 September 2017. 
24 This was also the case with the Commission, which now addresses more diverse questions concerning armed 
conflict, oil extraction, collective rights, indigenous peoples and mass expulsions. I BANTEKAS and L OETTE, 
above note 8, pp 277-279. 
25 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on 
Human and Peoples' Rights (adopted 10 June 1998; entered into force 25 January 2004) (Protocol). The Protocol 
was replaced by the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights on 1 July 2008 
merging the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Court of Justice of the African Union into one 
single court. See, in general, F VILJOEN, International Human Rights Law in Africa, Oxford University Press, 
New York 2012 2nd ed, pp 435-439. 
26 Separate Opinion of Vice-President Fatsah Ouguergouz in Tanganyika Law Society § 16; F VILJOEN, above 
note 25, p 438; GJ NALDI and K MAGLIVERAS, ‘Reinforcing the African System of Human Rights: The Protocol 
on the Establishment of a Regional Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (1998) 16 Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 431, 436. 
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one should not overemphasise the fragmentation of international jurisprudence or the 
divergence of views of the international bodies entrusted with monitoring human rights treaties. 
These matters can be mitigated, as it will be discussed herein, to a great extent, in the course 
of interpretation and by being aware of, and taking into account, the views of other international 
bodies and courts. The discussion below addresses the following issues: how the ACtHPR 
engages with international instruments in its reasoning; the quality of its judicial reasoning in 
terms of legal methodology; the different uses of these instruments and their impact on the 
interpretation of the ACHPR (3.2); and, finally, the development of the specificity of the 
ACHPR and the African human rights corpus juris in the pursuit of international human rights 
integration (3.3).  
Article 60 and Article 61 of the ACHPR concern the use of other international law 
instruments in interpreting the ACHPR. Article 60 provides that: 
 
The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human and 
peoples’ rights, particularly from the provisions of various African instruments on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the 
Organisation of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other 
instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the field of 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, as well as from the provisions of various instruments 
adopted within the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations of which the Parties 
to the present Charter are members. 
 
Article 61 refers only to the consideration of other rules as subsidiary measures to determine 
principles of law, and its scope is restricted to treaties, practices, customs, general principles, 
legal precedents and doctrine originating from or accepted by African States.27 Article 60 is 
therefore of a more general scope and has a more global outlook in terms of the instruments 
that may be taken into account in the process of interpretation. Articles 60 and 61 are interesting 
examples of the pursuit of human rights integration at the international and regional levels 
respectively.28 Other human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and 
                                               
27 Article 61 reads: ‘The Commission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary measures to determine the 
principles of law, other general or special international conventions, laying down rules expressly recognised by 
Member States of the Organisation of African Unity, African practices consistent with international norms on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, customs generally accepted as law, general principles of law recognised by African 
States as well as legal precedents and doctrine.’ 
28 E BREMS, above note 6, p 94.  
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Political Rights (ICCPR),29 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR),30 the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),31 and the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights (IACHR),32 do not contain equivalent clauses. This 
suggests that the drafters of the ACHPR specifically chose to include these guidelines 
supporting human rights integration. 
 
3.1 The Consideration of Relevant International Instruments and Views and Judgments 
of Other International Bodies or Courts  
The interpretative directions envisaged in Articles 60 and 61 are addressed to both the 
African Commission and the ACtHPR.33 Article 60 paves the way for the ACtHPR to draw 
inspiration from and use instruments that are not binding. The provision makes specific 
mention of international law on human and peoples’ rights and goes on to provide a non-
exhaustive list (‘particularly from’) including non-binding instruments such as the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) or instruments adopted by UN specialised agencies. 
Therefore, the ACtHPR is able to use non-binding instruments or even treaties that are not 
ratified by the State concerned as interpretative aids.34 This conclusion is further supported by 
the fact that when the drafters of the ACHPR and the Protocol did intend to introduce the 
requirement for a treaty to have been ratified by the State(s) concerned, they did so explicitly.35 
Interestingly, Article 60 ACHPR has looser requirements compared with Article 31(3)(c) 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) concerning the consideration of relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.36 The interpretative 
principle embodied in Article 31(3)(c) VCLT specifically requires (a) rules, strongly 
suggesting that it excludes non-binding instruments and (b) that these rules be applicable in 
                                               
29 (Adopted on 16 December 1966; entered into force on 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
30 (Adopted on 16 December 1966; entered into force on 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 
31 (Concluded 4 November 1950; entered into force 3 September 1953) ETS 5. 
32 (Concluded 21 November 1969; entered into force 18 July 1978) OAS Treaty Series No 36. 
33 Tanganyika Law Society § 107.4; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya § 
108. Individual judges in their opinions also refer to Articles 60 and 61. See Partly Dissenting Opinion of Vice-
President, Justice Elsie N. Thompson in Mohamed Abubakari § 4. Cf C HEYNS, above note 6, p 169 who argues 
that Articles 60 and 61 are not addressed to the ACtHPR. 
34 E BREMS, above note 6, p 95. 
35 See Article 3(1) Protocol referring to an ‘instrument ratified by the States concerned’ and Article 61 Charter 
referring to ‘general or special international conventions, laying down rules expressly recognised by Member 
States of the Organisation of African Unity’. 
36 Art. 31(3)(c) VCLT reads: ‘There shall be taken into account, together with the context . . . any relevant rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.’ See J PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, New York 2003, p 256; B RUDOLF, ‘Unity and Diversity in the 
Settlement of International Disputes’ in A ZIMMERMANN and R HOFMANN (eds), Unity and Diversity in 
International Law, Duncker and Humbolt, Berlin 2006, p 389, pp 391-392. 
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the relations between the parties, which means that at least the State concerned (if not all 
contracting parties to the treaty under interpretation) should have ratified the other treaty.37 
Consequently, Article 60 is a lex specialis interpretative rule, and it allows the ACtHPR to take 
a greater range of norms of international law into account than Article 31(3)(c) VCLT does.  
The ACtHPR rarely invokes Articles 60 and 61 ACHPR in an explicit fashion.38 Still, 
the ACtHPR regularly draws inspiration from a variety of treaties and non-binding instruments 
following the similar, long-standing practice of the African Commission.39 These include 
general human rights treaties, both global (e.g. the ICCPR40 or the ICESCR41) and regional 
(e.g. the ECHR42 or the IACHR43); specialised treaties of a regional scope, such as the Cultural 
Charter for Africa;44 and non-binding instruments ranging from the UDHR45 and the UNGA 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples46 to the work of the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Minorities47 or the 1988 UN Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form 
of Detention or Imprisonment.48  
In addition to international treaties, the ACtHPR gives extensive discussion to the views 
of UN bodies and the jurisprudence of other international human rights courts. In this way, it 
holds the appropriate and up-to-date interpretation of a treaty to be that developed by the body 
entrusted with monitoring it.49 For instance, the ACtHPR takes into consideration General 
Comments by the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the ICESCR Committee as 
                                               
37 For a useful overview of the question of the meaning of ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ see R 
GARDINER, Treaty Interpretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, pp 269-275; J PAUWELYN, above note 
36, pp 257-263. Cf. U LINDERFALK, ‘Who Are “the Parties”? Article 31, Paragraph 3(c) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention and the “Principle of Systemic Integration” Revisited’ (2008) LV Netherlands International Law 
Review 343. 
38 The ACtHPR explicitly used the provisions in Tanganyika Law Society § 107.4; African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya § 108.   
39 I BANTEKAS and L OETTE, above note 8, p 279. 
40 Tanganyika Law Society § 76; Lohé Issa Konaté § 9; Alex Thomas; Mohamed Abubakari; Actions pour la 
Protection des Droits de l’Homme; Abdoulaye Nikiema and others. 
41 Frank David Omary § 76; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya § 2. 
42 Tanganyika Law Society §§ 82.1, 106.2-106.5; Lohé Issa Konaté §§ 147-154, 158-163; Alex Thomas §§ 95-98, 
104, 116, 118-119, 146; Wilfred Onyango Nganyi §§ 136-154, 172-178; The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights v Libya § 95; Mohamed Abubakari §§ 27, 158, 224; Actions pour la Protection des Droits de 
l’Homme §§ 64, 134, 148. 
43 Tanganyika Law Society §§ 82.1, 106.2-106.5; Lohé Issa Konaté §§ 147-154, 158-163; Alex Thomas §§ 95-98, 
104; Wilfred Onyango Nganyi § 179; Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme § 95. 
44 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya § 178. 
45 Frank David Omary §§ 74, 76; Alex Thomas § 45. 
46 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya §§ 126-131. 
47 Ibid §§ 105-106. 
48 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Libya § 92. 
49 This is not always the case, however, since in certain instances the ACtHPR did not (explicitly) refer to the 
HRC’s views regarding the interpretation of the ICCPR. In particular, the ACtHPR did not discuss the HRC, 
General Comment 32, ‘Article 14, Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to fair trial’, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/GC/32 23 August 2007 regarding the understanding of Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR in Alex Thomas §§ 90-
91. See JD MUJUZI, above note 4, p 198. 
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authoritative statements on the interpretation of the provisions of the respective UN treaties.50 
This is a commendable practice since it mitigates, to a significant extent, the risk of diverging 
interpretations of the same or similar treaty provisions, both when the ACtHPR exercises its 
jurisdiction to interpret and apply another human rights treaty51 and when the ACtHPR takes 
another treaty into account as an aid to its interpretation of the ACHPR. 
More generally, cross-referencing and judicial borrowing52 offer the ACtHPR the 
opportunity to benefit from the substantial experience of other international courts on 
procedural issues. When addressing the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the 
ACtHPR gives due regard not only to the existing practice of the African Commission53 but 
also to the jurisprudence of the IACtHR and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).54 
The ACtHPR has consulted and referenced the 2013 El Salvador/Honduras v Nicaragua 
judgment by the ICJ in order to clarify the admissibility requirements for an application for a 
review of a judgment.55 The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has been a valuable guide for the 
Court in deciding whether it enjoys jurisdiction to scrutinise a national authority’s assessment 
of the admissibility of evidence.56 The practice of judicial borrowing serves the ACtHPR in 
two ways: first, it fosters dialogue and the coordination and convergence of international 
jurisprudence, and, second, it legitimises the ACtHPR in the eyes of its constituencies and 
audience during the first crucial years of its functioning.57 Notably, it is not only the ACtHPR 
that relies, for example, on the persuasive force of the case law of the ECtHR and the IACtHR, 
but also the respondent States.58 Therefore, the consideration and use of other international 
                                               
50 Tanganyika Law Society § 107.4; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya § 
181. 
51 The ACtHPR regularly finds violations of other human rights treaties and orders the respondent States to comply 
with their respective obligations. For example, the ACtHPR found a violation of the ICCPR in Alex Thomas § 
124; a violation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (adopted on 30 January 2007; 
entered into force on 15 February 2012); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Revised 
Treaty (adopted 24 July 1993; entered into force 23 August 1995; 2373 UNTS 233) in Lohé Issa Konaté §§ 164, 
167, 170; and the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance supplementary to the Protocol relating 
to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Protocol A/SP1/12/01; adopted 
December 2001) in Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme case §§ 135, 151. 
52 B PIRKER, ‘Interpreting Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms: Judicial Borrowing in International Courts’ in T 
BROUDE and Y SHANY (eds), Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2011, p 93. 
53 Tanganyika Law Society § 82.1; Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme §§ 93-94. 
54 Tanganyika Law Society § 82.1; Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme § 95. 
55 Frank David Omary § 52. 
56 Mohamed Abubakari §§ 25-27. 
57 R MURRAY, above note 8, p 219; Y SHANY, Questions of Jurisdiction and Admissibility before International 
Courts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2016, p 7. See also EF MAC-GREGOR, ‘What Do We Mean When 
We Talk About Judicial Dialogue? Reflections of a Judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2017) 
30 Harvard Human Rights Journal 89, 100. 
58 Tanzania’s arguments in Tanganyika Law Society § 103 drew on judgments by the IACtHR; Burkina Faso 
discussed the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in Lohé Issa Konaté § 127. 
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instruments, through cross-referencing and judicial borrowing, are a particularly useful 
‘currency’ before the ACtHPR. 
 
 
3.2 The Different Uses of Other International Instruments and the Interpretative Impact 
on the Construction of the ACHPR  
The interpretative principle contained in Article 60, allowing the ACtHPR to ‘draw 
inspiration’ from other human rights instruments, does not give a concrete indication of how 
the ACtHPR may use a given instrument or what the interpretative impact on its construction 
of the ACHPR may be. These are important considerations for assessing the ACtHPR’s 
reasoning and, more generally, for understanding human rights integration. Three main ways 
in which the ACtHPR uses external sources to interpret the ACHPR are discussed below.  
First, the ACtHPR has a regular practice of comparing the text of the ACHPR to other 
human rights treaties. It is common practice for all international courts and bodies to have 
recourse to other treaties in order to ascertain the ordinary meaning of certain terms contained 
in the treaty under interpretation.59 International judges are inclined to employ such a 
‘comparative reading’, especially during the initial stage of the interpretation process, without 
necessarily invoking a specific legal basis.60 Likewise, the ACtHPR does not elaborate on the 
legal basis for this interpretative practice — either Article 60 ACHPR or Article 31(1) VCLT 
with regard to interpreting a treaty in good faith and identifying the common use of a term by 
States in international law would suffice.61 The ACtHPR prefers to justify its practice by stating 
that the provisions of both the ECHR and the IACHR are similar to those of the ACHPR,62 or 
that the protection provided for a particular right is more detailed under the ICCPR.63  
Second, it is interesting how the similarity or dissimilarity of the ACHPR compared to 
another treaty is invoked to support an expansive or a restrictive interpretation respectively of 
                                               
59 As far as the ICJ is concerned, see Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, Merits, 26 
February 2007, ICJ Rep. 2007, p. 43 § 162; B PETERS, ‘Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation by the UN Treaty 
Bodies’ in H KELLER and G ULFSTEIN (eds), United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies – Law and Legitimacy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012, p 29, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2013298.  
60 R GARDINER, above note 37, p 283; B SIMMA and T KILL, ‘Harmonising Investment Protection and International 
Human Rights: First Steps towards a Methodology’ in C BINDER ET AL (eds), International Investment Law for 
the 21st Century, Oxford University Press, New York 2009, p 678, pp 683-686. 
61 R GARDINER, above note 37, pp 282-284; F BREMAN, ‘Treaty “Interpretation” in a Judicial Context’ (2004) 29 
Yale Journal International Law 315, 318; U LINDERFALK, above note 37, p 364; J PAUWELYN, above note 36, p 
256. 
62 Alex Thomas §§ 97-98.  
63 Ibid § 89; Wilfred Onyango Nganyi § 166. 
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a right under the ACHPR. This is important in cases in which the ACtHPR does not merely 
present a comparative overview of treaty provisions but also defines the scope of protection of 
the rights under the ACHPR by reference to other instruments. To give an example, given that 
Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR explicitly includes the right to free legal aid as an inherent element of 
the right to a fair trial,64 is the ACtHPR to construe Article 7(1)(c) ACHPR on the right to a 
fair trial, which lacks such a provision, as including the right to free legal aid? Should the 
ACtHPR use an a contrario argument in this instance, thereby excluding the right to legal aid 
from the scope of Article 7 ACHPR, or should the ACtHPR use a ‘by analogy’ argument 
supporting human rights integration and, consequently, read the right to free legal aid into the 
right to a fair trial under the ACHPR? The ACtHPR’s general approach is to pursue 
international human rights integration by reading more detailed and effective standards of 
human rights into the ACHPR’s scope. The ACtHPR established in a series of cases that the 
right to a fair trial includes the right to free legal assistance, and its reasoning was grounded in 
its interpretation of Article 7(1)(c) of the ACHPR in light of Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR.65 This 
has served to strengthen the weak safeguards under the ACHPR in the area of criminal 
procedure before and during trial.66 On another occasion, the ACtHPR read Article 66(2)(c) 
Revised ECOWAS Treaty on the rights of journalists and Article 9 ACHPR on freedom of 
expression together, incorporating the guarantees of the former into the protective scope of the 
latter.67 Furthermore, in Lohé Issa Konaté, which concerned the question of whether the harsh 
criminal penalties for defamation imposed on the applicant by Burkina Faso represented a 
disproportionate interference with his right to freedom of expression, the ACtHPR pursued a 
very restrictive construction of the ACHPR’s claw-back clause.68 The ACtHPR held that the 
phrase ‘within the law’ must be interpreted in a manner that does not subject the rights 
envisaged in the ACHPR to the domestic law of State parties. It did so by interpreting Article 
9 ACHPR with reference to international standards, including Article 19 ICCPR and the views 
thereon of the HRC,69 the practice of the African Commission70 and the case law of the ECtHR 
and the IACtHR.71 Although this is, in principle, a welcome development in the direction of a 
growing convergence among international bodies when interpreting limitation and claw-back 
                                               
64 Alex Thomas § 88. 
65 Ibid; Wilfred Onyango Nganyi § 165; Mohamed Abubakari § 138. 
66 C HEYNS, above note 6, 159. 
67 Abdoulaye Nikiema and others § 180. 
68 Article 9(2) reads ‘Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the 
law’ (emphasis added). 
69 Lohé Issa Konaté § 128, 
70 Ibid § 129. 
71 Ibid §§ 147-154, 158-163. 
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clauses, it raises the question of what the permissible impact of human rights integration should 
be within the confines of interpretation.72 The ICCPR, the IACHR and the ECHR do not 
contain similar clauses and, therefore, one might argue that they cannot qualify as appropriate 
comparators to justify the ‘neutralisation’ of the claw-back clauses provided in the ACHPR. In 
fact, the only other human rights treaty which includes similar claw-back clauses is the Revised 
Arab Charter,73 but the ACtHPR chose to make no reference to it.74 This underscores the 
inherent risk of selectiveness when determining which other treaties are to be taken into 
account when interpreting the ACHPR. 
A third way that the ACtHPR uses international instruments is by integrating detailed 
criteria articulated by other international bodies and courts into its own analysis and 
jurisprudence. Such criteria are employed to define legal terms and to support the progressive 
development of the corpus juris of human rights law. In Wilfred Onyango Nganyi, the ACtHPR, 
in seeking to establish the meaning of ‘trial within a reasonable time’ under Article 7(1)(d) 
ACHPR, took recourse to the criteria of reasonableness developed throughout the extensive 
case law of the ECtHR.75 In Alex Thomas, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the views of the 
HRC were invaluable guides for the ACtHPR in deciding whether a delay in the appeal 
proceedings before national courts met the threshold of ‘severity’ required for an alleged 
violation of inhuman treatment to be substantiated.76 In African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya, the ACtHPR addressed the issue of whether the Ogiek 
are an indigenous population.77 The elements of the definition of ‘indigenous people’ were 
discussed on the basis of the criteria developed in the work of the Commission through its 
Working group on indigenous populations and the UN Special Rapporteur on Minorities, 
which, according to the ACtHPR, generally reflect the current normative standards in 
international law for identifying indigenous populations.78  
                                               
72 D SHELTON, ‘International Decisions’ (2015) 109 American Journal of International Law 635; cf A 
RACHOVITSA, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration in Human Rights Law’ (2017) 66 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 557, 567-568. For a similar approach by the African Commission see I BANTEKAS 
and L OETTE, above note 8, p 279. 
73 League of Arab States, Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights (adopted 22 May 2004; entered into force 15 
March 2008) reprinted in 12 (2005) IHRR 893. 
74 The vice-president of the ACtHPR, in a separate opinion issued in another case, pointed out this problematic 
issue, but concluded, in line with the ACtHPR and with no further explanation, that the ACHPR should be 
interpreted in the same spirit as the ICCPR. See Separate Opinion of Vice-President Fatsah Ouguergouz in 
Tanganyika Law Society §§ 29-31.  
75 Wilfred Onyango Nganyi §§ 136-154. 
76 Alex Thomas §§ 146-147. 
77 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya. 
78 Ibid § 108. 
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The overall impact of other international human rights instruments in the ACtHPR’s 
case law should not be understated. The ACtHPR relies heavily on other treaties and the 
judgments of other international courts in its interpretation of the ACHPR. However, the 
ACtHPR does not appear willing to acknowledge openly that other instruments are given 
substantial weight in its reasoning. It insists on proclaiming that ‘The Court is fortified in its 
reasoning by the decision of the African Commission, the ECtHR and the IACtHR, which are 
courts of similar jurisdiction.’79 The ACtHPR frames the consideration of external instruments 
and case law as serving a secondary role and merely reaffirming an interpretation reached via 
other means. Yet, in practice, the systematic and lengthy references to other international 
instruments and jurisprudence, and their impact on the ACtHPR’s construction of the ACHPR, 
suggest otherwise.  
As a final note, there is considerable room to improve the transparency and quality of 
the ACtHPR’s methodology and reasoning. A good start for the ACtHPR might be invoking 
Articles 60 and 61 ACHPR in an explicit fashion and elaborating on the legal bases for the 
different uses of international instruments. Also, it cannot go unnoticed that the VCLT rules 
on treaty interpretation (Articles 31-33) rarely, if ever, feature in the ACtHPR’s judgments. It 
is curious that a newly established court such as the ACtHPR does not engage at all with the 
VCLT. Invoking the VCLT is a powerful way to enhance an international court’s legitimacy, 
not to mention the quality of its judicial reasoning. Other international courts, including the 
International Court of Justice, the ECtHR and the IACtHR, invoke and use the VLCT almost 
automatically.80 Even in instances in which a court invokes and applies the specialised 
interpretative rules contained in its own constitutive treaty, it still employs the VCLT on a 
complementary basis.81 The VCLT’s rules of interpretation are part of a ‘common language’ 
that all judges speak, and the ACtHPR should participate with its own ‘voice’.  
 
 
                                               
79 Alex Thomas §§ 95-98. See also Wilfred Onyango Nganyi §§ 169-179. 
80 K-M SOREL and V BORE EVENS, ‘Article 31’ in O CORTEN and P KLEIN (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the 
Law of Treaties – A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, p 804 at p 820. 
81 For example, the IACtHR in its legal reasoning employs a series of legal bases for legitimising the use of other 
treaties in the interpretation process. These bases include the construction of the IACHR within the system of 
which it forms part, the need for an evolutive interpretation of human rights, the principle of the corpus juris of 
human rights protection, Article 31(3) VCLT and Article 29(b) IACHR. See, for instance, Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v Paraguay, Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C, No. 125, 17 June 2005 §§ 125, 
126, 128. For a general discussion, see GL NEUMAN, ‘Import, Export and Regional Consent in the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 European Journal International Law 101; A RACHOVITSA, above note 2, pp 
88-96. 
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3.3 Nurturing the Specificity of the ACHPR in Connection with International Human 
Rights Integration: Human Rights Integration as an Interpretative ‘Bulldozer’, or as 
a Set of Alternative Arguments? 
The ACtHPR’s systematic reliance on the case law of the European and Inter-American 
Courts of Human Rights raises the question of whether such an influence is (or could be) 
disproportionate. The crux of the matter is whether there is a need to balance international 
human rights integration with the specificity of the African ACHPR, and, if so, how. 
International human rights integration means reading the ACHPR in light of global and other 
regional human rights standards; at the same time, however, the specificity of the ACHPR vis-
à-vis global international instruments and treaties (e.g. the ICCPR) and other regional treaties 
such as the ECHR and IACHR must be preserved. Although international human rights 
integration does not exclude regional human rights integration, these are two different 
arguments which may sometimes point in different interpretative directions. Heyns argues that 
the broad jurisdiction of the ACtHPR poses a risk to the specificity of the ACHPR, because the 
ACHPR will become just one of a number of treaties for the ACtHPR.82 Nonetheless, in this 
author’s opinion, this risk is more likely to materialise as a result not of the ACtHPR’s broad 
jurisdiction but of the manner in which the ACtHPR construes the ACHPR and its specificities 
in the context of interpretation.  
Conceptualising the development of the ACHPR within the context of international 
human rights law is a challenging task for the ACtHPR — an international court that is still 
comparatively young. On the one hand, it is reasonable to expect the ACtHPR to take into 
serious consideration, and benefit from, the long-standing jurisprudence of other regional 
human rights courts. On the other hand, coordination and convergence with global and other 
regional standards should not come at the expense of neglecting the development of a regional 
(African) human rights understanding, the contours of which have already been established by 
the African Commission.83 This specificity can be observed in the unique and special 
characteristics of human rights in the ACHPR and the local legal reality in State parties to the 
ACHPR, and it raises the possibility of different interpretations of specific human rights 
(compared with how the same rights are interpreted under other treaties) should different 
contexts require it.84 Human rights integration should not be seen and used as an interpretative 
                                               
82 C HEYNS, above note 6, p 167. 
83 I BANTEKAS and L OETTE, above note 8, p 281. Also AK PERRIN, above note 9, pp. 32-33. 
84 R HIGGINS, ‘A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench’ (2006) 55 International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 791, 795. 
Final version to be published in E. Bribosia, I. Rorive, A.-M. Correa (eds.), Human Rights Tectonics: 
Global Dynamics of Integration and Fragmentation (Intersentia, 2018, in press). 
15 
‘bulldozer’; rather, it should highlight difference and variety in legal standards. Pursuing and 
nurturing an African corpus juris, when necessary, is compatible with the European consensus 
argument articulated by the ECtHR and with the international and regional corpus juris 
interpretative tool put forward by the IACtHR.85 
These considerations need to be duly appreciated in the ACtHPR’s legal reasoning. 
Interpretative tools and principles are not mere technicalities, but reflect and articulate the 
ACtHPR’s approach. In this regard, human rights integration gives rise to different and equally 
valid arguments depending, among other things, on how an international body selects and uses 
relevant international instruments when construing its constitutive instrument. For instance, 
when the ACtHPR is in the process of discerning the ordinary meaning of a provision in the 
ACHPR, its starting point and primary focus should be the text of the ACHPR, without 
resorting prematurely to the case law of the ECtHR regarding the interpretation of an equivalent 
right under the ECHR, as was the case in Wilfred Onyango Nganyi.86 Moreover, the ACtHPR 
should engage in its reasoning with both the global and other regional standards in a balanced 
and consistent manner — especially if the State concerned is bound by said global standard(s).87 
Otherwise, the ACtHPR runs the risk of ‘Europeanising’ or ‘Inter-Americanising’ its 
jurisprudence88 in the sense of overemphasising the relevance and influence of other regional 
human rights treaties. One should also be mindful that the criteria developed by the 
jurisprudence of other international courts need to be tailored and applied in light of local 
circumstances and the legal reality in African countries. In the Mohamed Abubakari case, the 
fact that the judgment was not delivered publicly should have been given more weight in the 
assessment of the alleged violation of the right to a fair trial under the ACHPR, since, unlike 
in Europe, it is not common practice in many African States to have immediate access to the 
text of the judgment.  
Finally, it is likely that a preoccupation with the relevance of the (semi-)judicial practice 
of other international bodies could hinder the realisation of the ACtHPR’s potential for 
developing the specificities of the ACHPR and the African corpus juris.89 An obvious area of 
                                               
85 M DE PAUW, ‘The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Interpretive Method of External Referencing’ 
in Y HAECK, O RUIZ-CHIRIBOGA and C BURBANO-HERRERA (eds), The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 
Theory and Practice, Present and Future, Intersentia, Cambridge 2015, p 3, pp 20-22. 
86 JD MUJUZI, above note 4, p 218. 
87 This was a point underlined in the Partly Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President, Justice Elsie N. Thompson in 
Mohamed Abubakari §§ 9-10 and the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rafâa Ben Achour in Mohamed Abubakari §§ 
15-17. 
88 JD MUJUZI, above note 4, pp 218-219.  
89 For a comprehensive discussion see J GILBERT, ‘Litigating Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Africa: Potential, 
Challenges and Limitations’ (2017) 66 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 657. 
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interest is how the ACtHPR will address peoples’ rights under the ACHPR given the fact that 
the latter is markedly different to the ECHR and the IACHR. As discussed in Part 2, the African 
Commission in the SERAC and CESR v Nigeria case paved the way for the acknowledgment 
of the right to property, the right to housing and the right to a dignified life as collective human 
rights. Nonetheless, the ACtHPR is hesitant to follow this approach. In the 2017 judgment on 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya case, the ACtHPR 
gave an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Ogiek are an indigenous 
population.90 It also held that the expulsion of the Ogiek from their ancestral lands, against 
their will and without prior consultation, violated their communal ownership rights under the 
right to property. Still, the ACtHPR left it unclear as to whether this violation was pronounced 
with regard to the individual members of the Ogiek or the Ogiek as a collectivity (or even 
both).91 The ACtHPR reserved its judgment on reparations and, consequently, it remains to be 
seen whether it will recognise the entire community as a victim of human rights violations 
entitled to reparations.92 The ACtHPR’s overall position concerning the alleged violation of 
the community’s right to decent survival is rather disappointing. The applicants argued that 
limited access to and removal from their ancestral home threatened to destroy the community’s 
way of life and infringed their right to decent survival, thereby constituting a violation of 
Article 4. The ACtHPR highlighted the distinctive features of the ACHPR by underlining that 
‘Contrary to other human rights instruments, the ACHPR establishes the link between the right 
to life and the inviolable nature and integrity of the human being’93 and that violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights may engender conditions unfavourable to a decent life. 
The ACtHPR, however, held that the sole fact of eviction and the deprivation of specific rights 
did not amount to a violation of Article 4 ACHPR, and that although some members of the 
Ogiek had died, no causal connection had been established between the evictions and those 
deaths.94 The ACtHPR’s assessment may be fair and sound in light of the specific 
circumstances of the case. Even so, one cannot but emphasise that the ACtHPR failed to 
examine and assess the impact of the overall circumstances and the violations of other rights 
on the decent survival of the Ogiek as a people rather than merely on the decent survival of 
individual members. In this judgment, the ACtHPR took into account the practice of the 
African Commission, the views and General Comment of the ICESCR Committee and the case 
                                               
90 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya. 
91 Ibid §§ 128-131.  
92 Ibid § 223. The judgment on reparations is currently pending. 
93 Ibid § 152.  
94 Ibid §§ 152-155.  
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law of the IACtHR. Nonetheless, the practice of other bodies is of limited relevance to the 
ACtHPR’s development of the more promising provisions of the ACHPR. The ACtHPR needs 
to chart new territory, with the potential to surpass even the ground-breaking — but 
controversial by the standards of the IACHR — 2015 judgment in the Kaliña and Lokono 




4 Conclusions  
This chapter has focused on certain uniquely drafted features of the ACHPR and the 
Protocol thereto as they have been interpreted and applied by the ACtHPR in connection with 
human rights integration. The analysis demonstrated that human rights integration is fostered 
by, and dependent upon, the drafting and design of a human rights treaty. It was argued that, 
where appropriate, divergence in treaty design should be understood as contextual difference. 
Human rights integration should evaluate such instances carefully and should accommodate 
them in legal reasoning. In this sense, human rights integration is not a single argument, but 
rather it consists of different possible arguments depending on the explicit and implicit choices 
made in the process of interpretation. The discussion demonstrated how human rights 
integration can and should be relevant in supporting convergence on a regional or universal 
level or both. In the case of the ACtHPR, human rights integration highlights (and at the same 
time justifies) different arguments and interpretative directions concerning the advancement of 
an African human rights corpus juris and/or the convergence of the ACHPR with other regional 
and universal human rights treaties. 
The ACtHPR is very receptive to using other international instruments in interpreting 
the ACHPR. This is a practice that merits careful study, for two distinct reasons. First, the 
interpretative use of other international instruments and views of other bodies helps avoid some 
of the difficulties associated with the ACtHPR’s broad jurisdiction. Second, the use of other 
international instruments, and the practice of judicial borrowing in general, are the means by 
which the ACtHPR construes the international and regional corpus juris on human rights. The 
discussion demonstrated that the ACtHPR integrates more detailed human rights standards into 
                                               
95 See Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname, Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C, No 309, 25 
November 2015 §§ 107-114; Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Alberto Pérez Pérez in Kaliña and Lokono 
Peoples v Suriname § 9 and commentary L LIXINSKI, ‘International Decisions – Case of the Kaliña and Lokono 
Peoples v Suriname’ (2017) 111 American Journal of International Law 147, 152.  
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the ACHPR’s scope by reading the ACHPR in light of a variety of international treaties and 
other instruments. Although this is, in principle, a welcome practice, it is important not to lose 
sight of the question of what the appropriate impact of human rights integration should be 
within the confines of interpretation. In this respect, there is the question as to whether, and, if 
so, to what extent, the varying formulations of human rights across different treaties preclude 
the convergence of standards and, accordingly, dictate the preservation of the specificity of a 
human rights treaty provision. There is also the issue of how the ACtHPR will calibrate its case 
law in order to develop the distinctive features of the ACHPR and construe an African human 
rights corpus juris while embedding them in international human rights law. How the ACtHPR 
assesses the relevance of the jurisprudence and views of other regional courts and bodies on 
human rights to the interpretation of the ACHPR, and the influence they should exert, will also 
be crucial. 
This brings us to the final point, which relates to the quality of the ACtHPR’s reasoning. 
Legal reasoning is not merely a matter of technicality or semantics; it is the means by which 
all of the foregoing considerations are put into practice and, therefore, it is a factor in evaluating 
the ACtHPR’s overall contribution to international law.96 The ACtHPR should be more 
transparent with regard to acknowledging the significant influence of other international 
treaties and instruments and the views of other international bodies and courts on its case law. 
Transparency may also be improved by explicitly invoking the principles of interpretation 
under the ACHPR (Articles 60 and 61) and by engaging with, and using, the VCLT rules on 
treaty interpretation (Articles 31-33). It is expected that the subject matter of the complaints 
that are brought before the ACtHPR in future will be more diverse, and therefore the ACtHPR 
will have the opportunity to clarify and develop the specificities of the ACHPR.  
 
 
                                               
96 See JG MERRILLS, above note 9, p 21. See also H LAUTERPACHT, above note 9, pp 37-40. 
